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Chapter 1
Introduction
Economists tend to see the world through the lens of their models. In
attempting to find causal relationships in the complexities of economic
interactions they need to abstract from many details. They make
assumptions whenever this allows to simplify the exposition without
affecting the results. Crucial assumptions, however, do affect the es-
sential findings and should thus draw particular attention. The neglect
of housing as a consumption and investment good in many models of
portfolio choice theory may be such a crucial assumption. While this
assumption my be justifiable in some cases, I will argue that housing –
as a primary residence and not as an investment in a real estate fund
– can play a central role in determining optimal asset demand.
First, housing is a prominent asset in most households’ portfolios
and responsible for a significant part of the households’ expenses. Yao
and Zhang (2005) report from the 2001 Survey of Consumer Finances
that two thirds of U.S. households own their primary residence. For
those, home value accounts for 55 percent of financial assets. Stock
investments, however, account for less than 40 percent of the portfolio
among those who do hold stocks at all. When looking at all house-
holds the number even shrinks to a meager twelve percent. Flavin and
Yamashita (2002) find that on average the primary residence exceeds
households’ net worth until about age 50.
Second, housing investments are unusual in that they build on two
motives – the consumption and the investment motive. The right to
live in a particular residence can be interpreted as a consumption good
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that households can acquire either by renting from the owner or by
buying their own housing stock from which housing services can then
be derived. At the same time, households may follow an investment
incentive in that they consider real estate as an attractive long-term
investment that is not subject to inflation risk. The coexistence of two
possibly conflicting motives can yield interesting results.
Third, housing investments are special in at least two ways, their
illiquidity and their role as collateral for credit. While housing is an
investment good with uncertain capital value not unlike other assets
it cannot be traded in small shares and at low cost. Transaction costs
in the housing market arise for a range of reasons. Brokers fees and
taxes result in monetary costs that are more or less proportional to the
property’s value and according to Cocco (2005) in the order of eight
to fifteen percent in the United States. Moreover, there are informa-
tion and relocation costs which may vary substantially between house
trades depending on characteristics such as the distance to the new
house, preferences, etc. Those can come along as monetary costs and
in the form of disutility. Transaction costs in the housing market act as
an incentive to minimize house trades, in other words, the occurrence
of adjustments of the housing stock. The second interesting peculiar-
ity is the potential to use the housing stock as a collateral for credit.
Housing investments are often highly leveraged in that investors are
only required to invest a certain fraction of the house price up front,
the so-called down payment.
Fourth, classic portfolio theory generally abstracts from housing
as an additional illiquid asset class with its role as credit collateral.
In the classic models elegant results can be derived both in the static
and dynamic framework. The predictions’ empirical validity though
is weak. I do not propose housing as a satisfying solution to portfolio
choice theory’s many puzzles. However, I will show that the integration
of housing into a model can have a significant effect on households’
optimal portfolio demand over the life cycle. Young households invest
strongly into housing as they attempt to reduce the number of future
house trades. Often credit constrained they show very low financial
assets other than housing. If asset market participation involves costs,
an assumption that is often made in life cycle simulation models, the
reduction of savings due to the presence of housing can make asset
3market participation unattractive for significant shares of the young
(Cocco (2005)).
In order to illustrate the impact of housing on portfolio demand
I construct a partial equilibrium model of portfolio demand over the
life cycle. The model incorporates housing as an additional good in its
dual role as nondurable consumption and investment good. The key
features of the housing good are its illiquidity – house sales involve a
significant transaction cost – and its collateral role, the households’
credit line depends on the current value of the house. Households face
three sources of risk: uncertain labor income, risky stock returns, and a
risky house price. As I cannot find closed form solutions of the dynamic
optimization problem I solve the model numerically in order to find
optimal policies rules, i.e. the optimal behavior of the household given
the state of the world. Using those, it is straightforward to simulate
the model.
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2
discusses classic models of portfolio choice theory both in a static and
dynamic framework. In each case I will present the effect of integrating
housing into the analysis. Chapter 3 provides a brief overview of the
empirical evidence on households’ portfolios and also mentions ways
in which the theoretical literature attempts to solve the remaining
puzzles. Chapter 4 conveys the presentation of my simulation model
and the calibration part. The computational strategy is explored in
Chapter 5. Results of the simulation are discussed in Chapter 6 which
also entails a discussion of possible extensions. Chapter 7 concludes.

Chapter 2
Housing and Portfolio
Choice Theory
Before presenting an overview of households’ portfolio allocation deci-
sions in Chapter 3 I first concentrate on basic theoretical predictions
of the portfolio choice literature. To be more exact, I augment a num-
ber of canonical portfolio choice models with a stylized housing good.
Incorporating housing hardly changes the results in some cases. Other
models, however, become significantly more complicated by the intro-
duction of housing as can be seen further below.
In many models housing plays a dual role; it is both, a durable
consumption good and an asset class of its own. In this section I first
look at static portfolio choice models that integrate housing simply as
an additional risky asset not unlike stocks. I then introduce illiquidity
into the analysis which is an important feature of housing for most
investors. Secondly, I will show that standard results carry over to
dynamic and life cycle settings even in the presence of housing as an
investment good. Third, in many models housing has an intrinsic value
for the household – utility is derived from housing services that are re-
lated to the stock of housing owned. Adjusting the stock is costly
and households will therefore only infrequently optimize their hous-
ing stock. In between those adjustments standard results of portfolio
choice theory can be shown to hold.
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2.1 Static Models with Housing
Housing as an Additional Liquid Asset. At this point I delib-
erately simplify housing’s role in investors’ portfolios to its investment
dimension. Although most households do not exceed a handful of
house trades in the course of their lifetime I concentrate on a simple
model where housing is a liquid asset with uncertain capital value not
unlike other assets. In this framework one might think of housing as a
real estate investment fund; its share price is uncertain and investors
can buy or sell shares of more or less any amount. Not surprisingly,
the investor’s optimization problem does not change much. Housing
simply provides an additional investment opportunity.
In the very basic one period portfolio selection framework which is
originally due to Harry Markowitz (1952)1 investors care only about
the mean and variance of their portfolio. In order to incorporate hous-
ing into this model I simply add the risky housing investment to n
other risky and a risk-free asset with known return Rf . Denote the
vector of expected excess returns as µ and the variance-covariance
matrix of returns as Ω,
µ =
(
µ1 . . . µn µh
)′
, Ω =
(
Σ Γs h
Γ′s h σ
2
h
)
where Σ stands for the usual covariance matrix of asset return other
than housing, σ2h for the variance of the housing return, and Γ
′
s h =
[σ1h, . . . , σnh] for the vector of covariances between the individual as-
set returns and the return on the housing investment. In Markowitz’
framework a portfolio is efficient if the vector of optimal portfolio
shares αminimizes the portfolio variance given a fixed expected return
R¯.
min
α
α′Ωα subject to (2.1)
α′µ+Rf = R¯.
The result is very standard: the risky asset’s optimal portfolio
share depends on its expected excess return, the conditional variance-
covariance matrix of returns, and the Lagrange multiplier with its
1Or more recently Markowitz (1992).
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known interpretation as the coefficient of relative risk aversion as in
Samuelson (1970)2.
α =
(
α1 . . . αn αh
)′ = Ω−1µ
θ
(2.2)
Individual preferences enter the expression for optimal portfolio
shares only through the coefficient θ. Thus, Tobin’s (1958) mutual
fund separation theorem applies in this simple case – portfolios dif-
fer in scale, i.e. in the proportion of funds invested in the efficient
combination of risky assets, but not in the composition of the risky
portfolio. Depending on the covariances between housing and equity
returns the introduction of housing as an additional asset is likely to
affect the efficient Markowitz portfolio.3 However, nothing essentially
new is added to the analysis by the introduction of the liquid housing
good.
Housing as an Illiquid Asset. As argued in the introduction ad-
justing one’s housing stock can be costly for a variety of reasons.
Therefore, I now introduce the first key feature of housing investments,
their illiquidity. Taking this assumption to the extreme I model hous-
ing investments as irreversible. The owned housing stock is then simply
a constraint on the investor’s portfolio selection problem.
The following exposition is still set in the static mean-variance
framework where housing enters only as an investment good without
any intrinsic value.4 Now, however, the risky housing investment is ex-
ogenously fixed for the period of interest to α¯h. The investor’s problem
then becomes
min
α
α′Ωα subject to (2.3)
α′µ+Rf = R¯
αh = α¯h.
The solution is straightforward and delegated to the appendix. The
optimal portfolio share for each risky asset other than housing is given
2This relies on CRRA specification of the wealth dependent utility function.
3Housing is not redundant and thus held in equilibrium as long as the other
assets do not span it on the µ-σ-plane.
4This part builds strongly on Pelizzon and Weber (2003).
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by
αi = Σ−1
µi
θ
− αhΣ−1Γsh. (2.4)
In the presence of an illiquid housing investment the optimal port-
folio shares consist of two parts. First, the investor optimally chooses
an efficient Markowitz portfolio just as in the unconstrained problem
in equation (2.2) which is identical to the standard case without hous-
ing altogether. Second, financial investments are used to hedge the
house price risk, the risk inherent in the return to housing. That sec-
ond part depends crucially on the covariances between housing and
asset returns Γsh. Thus, an illiquid housing investment has a non-
trivial effect on the optimal financial investment portfolio. This effect
depends not only on the covariance of asset and housing returns, but
also on the given level of the housing stock relative to total wealth, the
‘housing constraint’, a term coined by Flavin and Yamashita (2002). If
that level depends on other factors, such as age or wealth, interesting
patterns might emerge.5
Flavin and Yamashita consider portfolio selection problems in a
mean-variance framework at different points over the life cycle and
assume an exogenous pattern for the “housing constraint”. In their
model younger households who show large housing to net worth ratios
are forced into highly leveraged positions. Hence, a young household
has an incentive to reduce her portfolio’s risk by paying down a part
of the mortgage or by investing in safe assets instead of stocks. Older
households with lower housing to net worth ratios optimally hold larger
parts of their wealth in risky assets. Hence, even without preference
heterogeneity and constant investment opportunities the optimal port-
folio of financial assets varies over the life cycle. Note, however, that
this finding depends crucially on the rigid assumption of an exoge-
nous housing to net worth ratio. An endogenous determination of the
demand for housing is absent from the model.
5The obvious idea that wealthier households are likely to prefer larger, more
expensive houses does not suffice to motivate exogenous variation in the housing
constraint. It is the ratio of housing to total wealth that determines the constraint.
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2.2 A Standard Life Cycle Model with Hous-
ing
Merton’s (1969) basic result of optimal portfolio allocation in a static
problem has been extended to multi period settings. Merton himself
has proved the equivalence of dynamic and one period portfolio choice
problems under the assumption that the investor’s wealth dependent
utility function is either logarithmic or of CRRA form, whereby the
latter also requires investment opportunities to be constant over time.
In such an environment it follows that myopic portfolio choice is opti-
mal.
In this section I will demonstrate that Merton’s result carries over
to the life cycle framework. In order to do this, I present a standard
life cycle model that features housing. However, I restrict my attention
to a very simple setup where housing is only an additional investment
opportunity in the household’s optimization problem. It does not yet
enter the utility function directly and it is no longer illiquid. After pre-
senting this very stylized model I explore the effects of human wealth
on our benchmark result – the optimal portfolio shares’ independence
from household characteristics except for the degree of risk aversion.
Life Cycle Models. In the traditional life cycle model that builds
upon work fromModigliani and Brumberg (1954), Ando and Modigliani
(1963), and Friedman (1957) households save in order to smooth con-
sumption over the course of their lives which is optimal under the
standard assumption of concave utility. Young households with rela-
tively low earnings borrow against future income and later begin to
pay back their debt and accumulate savings as income grows. Af-
ter retirement the wealth is spent on consumption in excess of public
pension benefits and capital income. The simple framework has been
extended in many directions. In order to highlight the main point I
abstract from complications such as the bequest motive, more realistic
borrowing constraints, and time inconsistent preferences at this point.
Neither will I consider household heterogeneity in terms of financial
sophistication, varying attitudes toward risk or impatience.
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Setup of the Model. In this very simplified model which originally
builds upon Samuelson (1969) the household lives for T periods. As
there is no bequest motive the household will consume all her remain-
ing wealth in period T . For simplicity she does not receive any labor
income for now, but enters the model endowed with W0. Her initial
wealth can be used in two ways: immediate consumption or saving and
investment in a risk-free asset, stocks or housing. The household’s in-
vestments generate an overall return that is a weighted average of the
individual returns.
Rp = Rf + αs(Rs −Rf ) + αh(Rh −Rf ) . (2.5)
In the absence of labor income today’s savings have to finance
the present discounted value of future consumption. The household’s
intertemporal budget constraint is thus given by
Wt − Ct =
T∑
j=t+1
j∏
s=t+i
(1 +Rps)
−1Cj (2.6)
which can be transformed into the dynamic budget constraint6
Wt+1 = (Wt − Ct)(1 +Rpt+1) . (2.7)
I will assume the often used specification of utility with a constant
coefficient of risk aversion θ. As stated above, there is no bequest
motive and housing does not enter the utility function in this model.
u(Ct) =
C1−θt − 1
1− θ (2.8)
6Pushing (2.6) one period forward and rearranging leads to:
Wt+1 = Ct+1 +
TX
j=t+2
jY
s=t+2
(1 +Rps)
−1Cj
= (1 +Rpt+1)
TX
j=t+1
jY
s=t+1
(1 +Rps)
−1Cj
which can be combined with the intertemporal budget constraint to find the dy-
namic budget constraint (2.7).
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The Household Problem. The household chooses a consumption
and an investment plan for each period to maximize expected dis-
counted lifetime utility subject to the budget constraint.
max
{Ct}, {αst}, {αht}
U0 =
T∑
t=1
βtu(Ct) (2.9)
subject to (2.7)
The problem can be formulated recursively. The Bellman equation
with control variables {C,αs, αh} and state {W} then becomes
Vt(Wt) = u(Ct) + βE
[Vt+1(Wt+1)] . (2.10)
In the last period the household consumes all her remaining wealth
as there is no bequest motive such that the value function VT (WT )
equals u(WT ).
VT (WT ) = u
(
(WT−1 − CT−1)(1 +RpT )
)
(2.11)
In period T − 1 the Bellman equation takes on the following form
that can be modified slightly as (WT−1 − CT−1)1−θ is known with
certainty at time T − 1. The maximum is taken with respect to CT−1,
αst, and αht.
VT−1(WT−1) =
= max
{
u(CT−1) + βE
[
1
1− θ (WT−1 − CT−1)
1−θ(1 +RpT )
1−θ
]}
(2.12)
= max
{
u(CT−1) + β
1
1− θ (WT−1 − CT−1)
1−θ E
[
(1 +RpT )
1−θ
]}
(2.13)
At this point it becomes clear that the maximization problem can
be separated into two distinct ones. The household has to find both, an
optimal consumption and an optimal investment plan. The allocation
of savings among different assets, however, is unaffected by the total
level of wealth. The optimal asset shares αs and αh are set to maximize
the last part of the value function E
[
(1 +RpT )
1−θ]. Wealth only enters
as a constant multiplicative factor into the maximization.
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Merton’s Result. Given the CRRA form for the utility function
and assuming jointly lognormally distributed returns for equity and
housing investments optimal portfolio shares depend only on the first
and second moments of the return processes. This is again the famous
result that is originally due to Merton (1969) and illustrated nicely in
Campbell and Viceira (2001). Using small letters for logarithms and
matrix notation with α = ( αsαh ), r = (
rs
rh ), σ
2 =
(
σ2s
σ2h
)
, Σ =
(
σ2s σsh
σsh σ
2
h
)
,
and ι = ( 11 ), Merton’s result can be stated neatly as
αoptt =
1
θ
Σ−1t (Etrt+1 − rft+1ι+
σ2t
2
) . (2.14)
The derivation can be found in the appendix. Note that if we
shut off the return covariances we get back to the standard result of
the better known case with only one risky asset. With σsh = 0 the
solution for αopts becomes
αopts =
E(rs − rf ) + σ2s2
θσ2s
. (2.15)
2.3 Separation of Investment and Consump-
tion Motive
Flavin and Yamashita (2002) see the household’s demand for housing
as being ‘overdetermined’. Consumers’ housing needs can differ from
an optimal holdings of real estate from the investor’s point of view. In
theory, rental markets for housing services could separate the decision
on housing investment and consumption of housing services. In fact
not only the poorest households who cannot afford the initial down
payment rent their dwelling. However, rental housing is not a perfect
substitute for owner-occupied housing in many settings.
The classic reference for this problem comes from Henderson and
Ioannides (1983) who identify an externality from renting. In their
model the amount of housing services that the household derives from
her apartment depends on the size or quality of the housing stock, the
so-called housing capacity, and the rate of utilization. Due to prob-
lems of asymmetric information and incomplete contracts the landlord
cannot assess the true utilization of the property and thus recover the
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true cost of maintenance. However, from the landlord’s point of view
real estate is not different from any other asset. Thus, in asset market
equilibrium the additional cost of higher utilization is eventually paid
for by the tenant in terms of a higher rent. Henderson and Ioannides
show that in equilibrium utilization rates are higher for renters than
for owner-occupiers as the former cannot credibly commit to low uti-
lization rates, i.e. to treat the property well. Hence, owning dominates
renting under certainty. If returns are stochastic the uncertain future
wealth implied by gains or losses in house value can partially or fully
offset this advantage. However, Henderson and Ioannides show that
even under uncertainty people in a certain income range distort their
investment and consumption decision and owner-occupy rather than
rent.
Fernandez-Villaverde and Krueger (2002) add another twist to that
argument. Housing’s role as a collateral for credit makes owning prop-
erty even more attractive as it is a means to insure against future
income uncertainty. On the other hand, housing investments can-
not generally be fully refinanced with a mortgage. The necessary
down payment could force especially younger households to reduce
nondurable consumption significantly in order to save for the upfront
cost of buying a house. The attractiveness of owning is further reduced
by the higher transaction costs – it is certainly reasonable to assume
higher relocation costs for home-owners when compared to renters.
Last but not least there may be institutional reasons for preferring
owning to renting. The most obvious is the differential treatment in the
tax system. Depreciation allowances for landlords and the deductibil-
ity of mortgage interest payments make owning very attractive.7
As illustrated above there are good reasons for a dominance of
owning over renting which cannot, however, account for the widespread
occurrence of renting even among the wealthy. In the remainder of
this thesis I will abstract from the existence of rental markets and
concentrate on the effects of home purchases, though. The main reason
being the desire to keep the model tractable. An explicit treatment
of the decision whether to own or rent can be found in Platania and
Schlagenhauf (2000).
7Cf. Flavin and Yamashita (2002).
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2.4 Housing Services in the Utility Function
In the models presented so far housing was just another risky invest-
ment opportunity. I did allow the housing stock to be illiquid, but
so far there was no intrinsic value attached to holding housing stock.
There is, of course, a strong incentive to invest in housing. Consider
a tenant who pays a monthly rent. The pure fact that she spends a
considerable part of her earnings on the rent, no matter whether it
is a fifth or a third, demonstrates that households derive utility from
housing services. In the following section I therefore consider utility
functions that depend fully or in part on the consumption of durable
goods such as housing services.
Durable Consumption. In their seminal contribution Grossman
and Laroque (1990) introduce a utility function that depends exclu-
sively on a durable good that generates consumption services. That
durable good also appears as a component of the household’s total
wealth. Despite the fact that their approach is more general and ap-
plicable to all durable consumption goods, such as e.g. automobiles, I
will henceforth call that good housing for the purpose of relating the
model to this thesis.
In this model houses come in various sizes but are indivisible once
bought. The owner derives utility from the house she lives in – there
is no rental market to separate the consumption from the investment
decision. Adjusting the housing stock in excess of what is lost due to
depreciation is only possible by selling the total stock and buying a
new house of the wanted size. However, selling one’s property leads to
a proportionate transaction cost an assumption that builds on agency
problems in the real estate market, broker fees, and taxes. In the
absence of this friction the consumer would keep his durable good
consumption at a constant proportion to her wealth. That obviously
cannot be optimal in the presence of transaction costs. Here, small
variations in wealth will not lead to an adjustment of the housing
stock.
Grossman and Laroque solve this dynamic model as an optimal
stopping problem where the housing stock’s illiquidity enters as a fixed
cost. They find that the consumer optimally sets a target level for the
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ratio of liquid wealth to the housing stock where liquid wealth refers
to total wealth less the cost of selling the current house. She only acts
when that ratio reaches an upper or lower threshold. Hence, the home
purchase decision is endogenous and fully rational. Numerical simu-
lations show that even a small transaction cost of about five percent
of the purchase price lead to very infrequent house trades about every
twenty to thirty years. The household no longer equates the marginal
utility of consumption with the marginal utility of wealth at all points
of time. Optimal consumption is no longer a smooth function of wealth
and the Consumption based CAPM fails. However, the investor still
holds mean-variance efficient portfolio at all times and the standard
CAPM continues to hold.
Nondurable and Durable Consumption. Flavin and Nakagawa
(2004) as well as Pelizzon and Weber (2003) provide extensions to
Grossman and Laroque’s path breaking model in that they allow for
the coexistence of durable and nondurable consumption in the house-
holds’ utility function. That allows them to study the impact of hous-
ing on the dynamics of nondurable consumption and the explicit mod-
eling of house price risk. The two articles differ most and for all in that
Flavin and Nakagawa consider a special case as they assume a block
diagonal variance-covariance matrix, i.e. zero covariances between the
return to housing and the returns to financial assets.
The models are set in continuous time and at each instant the
household has to decide whether it is optimal to adjust the housing
stock immediately. That decision depends on the value of the pro-
gram conditional on selling the house versus not selling the house. If
the current stock of housing is far off its optimum and endogenous
or voluntary house trade occurs. In addition, one could imagine ex-
ogenous or forced house trades which could be caused by events such
as e.g. death, retirement, change in marital status, or the appear-
ance of children. Imaging that the house is not sold at time t equal
to zero. By continuity, there must be an interval (0, s) during which
housing stock adjustments can be ignored. For that interval, the cur-
rent housing stock becomes a state variable and optimal policy rules
for nondurable consumption and financial investments can be derived.
Optimal nondurable consumption is related to the standard equality
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of marginal utility and the derivative of the value function with respect
to wealth. The optimal investments in risky assets can be shown to
follow8
αi =
(
− ∂V∂W
∂2V
∂W 2
W
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
θ˜
Σ−1µi − αhΓihΣ−1 . (2.16)
As emphasized by Pelizzon and Weber this expression is analogous to
the solution of the static mean-variance analysis in (2.4). Note the
effect of the introduction of housing as a second state variable on θ˜, a
term that signifies relative risk aversion. In the simpler case above, this
term used to be a constant – the coefficient of relative risk aversion –
that depended solely on the curvature parameter of the instantaneous
utility function. Now, however, the term is no longer necessarily con-
stant even with CRRA utility. It depends on the curvature of the value
function and thus on the state variables. The property that risk aver-
sion varies with the state is also considered by Grossman and Laroque
who find that the household is relatively more risk averse immediately
after purchasing a new home. Housing wealth thus affects portfolio
allocation through its impact on investors’ relative risk aversion.
The second term of (2.16) signifies once again a hedge portfolio.
Hence, in the presence of the illiquid housing stock in its dual form
as a durable consumption good and as an asset households choose
the efficient Markowitz portfolio conditional on their risk attitude.
However, risky financial assets are also used to hedge the exposition
to the constrained asset housing. This last motive is independent of
the investor’s risk attitude. In other words, if stock adjustments are
costly and therefore infrequent the optimal portfolios in between house
trades will be affected by house price risk. The hedge term disappears
in Flavin and Nakagawa’s solution as they assumed a block diagonal
covariance matrix, i.e. zero covariance between the house price and all
asset prices. Hence, in their model the portfolio choice problem can be
separated between real and financial assets and the traditional CAPM
holds in between house trades.
8The derivation of (2.16) is sketched in the appendix.
Chapter 3
Household Portfolios
Having presented some findings of the theoretical literature on port-
folio choice in the preceding section it is now time to confront the
predictions with empirical evidence. In the following paragraphs I will
first point to the important separation of the investor’s participation
and portfolio composition decision. In a second step I will highlight
some prominent patterns in households’ portfolio allocations.
Theoretical models generally simplify the broad range of available
assets to a handful of choices, a risk free and one or more risky assets.
When looking for testable patterns in the data an important prelim-
inary decision needs to be made on the definition of asset classes. In
particular it is critical to define the term risky assets. Direct stockhold-
ings and indirect stockholdings through mutual funds and retirements
accounts must clearly be classified as risky assets. Foreign assets are
also risky as they are subject to interest and exchange rate risk. While
long-term government bonds are often seen as almost risk-free, they
are also subject to interest rate risk and inflation risk given that they
are generally not indexed to the price level. Finally, equity in privately
owned businesses and real estate can also be included by the definition.
In what follows I use the classification employed by Bertaut and Starr-
McCluer (2002) and present numbers for three sets of assets: direct
and indirect stockholding, risky financial assets, and total risky assets.
The second definition adds corporate, foreign and mortgage backed
bonds to direct and indirect stockholdings. The third definition also
includes business equity and investment real estate. All numbers are
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taken from the Survey of Consumer Finances.
The famous rise of the equity culture – a dramatic increase in the
proportion of stockholders in many countries during the 1990s – really
builds on two effects. It is certainly true that stocks have come into the
focus of many investors for the first time during the last decade and
a half. People who used to invest exclusively in safe assets began to
add stocks or more importantly mutual funds to their portfolios. On
the other hand, those who already used to hold stocks shifted larger
parts of their portfolios into that direction. For instance, Guiso and
Japelli (2002) find that the two effects had about equal impact on total
investments in risky assets in Italy.
Hence, when looking at households’ investment decisions two dis-
tinct concepts need to be understood. Before allocating the available
funds to different assets the household has to decide whether to invest
in a certain asset class at all – the participation decision. In a second
step the household determines individual portfolio shares conditional
on the participation decision. That is the portfolio composition. In
order to disentangle the underlying mechanisms one has to look at the
two question separately.
3.1 Determinants of Portfolio Decisions
The empirical literature has identified a handful of characteristics that
seem to have first-order effects on investors’ participation and alloca-
tion decisions. The most important among those are the investor’s
wealth, age, and educational attainment. For each one I will quickly
describe prominent theoretical arguments that might explain the un-
derlying effect before presenting the empirical findings.
Wealth. Standard portfolio choice theory predicts that richer house-
holds will hold more risky portfolios if risk aversion depends negatively
on wealth. To be more exact, richer households hold more risky assets
if absolute risk aversion decreases in wealth and they invest a larger
share of their portfolio in risky assets if relative risk aversion decreases
in wealth.1 In the benchmark case with constant relative risk aver-
1The very common Constant Relative Risk Aversion formulation of instanta-
neous utility implies decreasing absolute risk aversion. Cf. Gollier (2002).
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sion richer households are simply scaled up versions of their poorer
counterparts. If this widely used assumption is made wealth predicts
higher absolute investments into risky assets.
Barsky, Juster, Kimball, and Shapiro (1997) use survey data and
experimental designs to estimate individual coefficients of risk aver-
sion. They go on and try to relate those to the respondents’ risk-taking
behavior in the real world. They find that lower risk aversion does in-
deed increase the likelihood of holding stocks.2 If there is exogenous
ex-ante variation in risk attitude only the less risk averse will engage
strongly in risky high-return activities and – given that they are lucky
enough – become rich. Hence, when looking at the data ex post one
should expect to find a correlation of risk-taking and wealth.
However, Carroll (2002b) argues that the empirical evidence fails
to detect a link between wealth growth and expressed ex-ante risk
aversion. He concludes that ex-ante variation in risk attitude cannot
explain the observed correlation between wealth and risk taking. He
proposes a variation of the standard model in which wealth enters
the utility function directly in Carroll (2000). The utility gain from
wealth can result from very different motives such as the desire for
philanthropic bequests or pure greed. Carroll models wealth as a lux-
ury good and builds upon Max Weber’s (Weber 1958) idea that love of
wealth for its own sake is the spirit of capitalism. His model predicts
realistic wealth accumulation patterns and portfolio shares especially
for the wealthy elderly.
Another argument builds upon capital market imperfections. Con-
centrating on wealth held in privately owned business Quadrini (1999)
tries to find an explanation for the concentration of entrepreneurs
among the very rich. He supposes a minimum efficient scale for private
businesses and credit market imperfections that require entrepreneurial
investments to be largely self-financed due to adverse selection and
moral hazard problems. Taken together the two assumptions can in-
deed explain the low probability of households with low or moderate
wealth to become engaged in entrepreneurial activities. However, the
model cannot account for the higher risk in the financial portfolio of
business owners when compared to other households.
2Note, however, that their estimated coefficients are smaller than classical port-
folio theory suggests.
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Age. The investor’s age can affect the portfolio decision for a number
of reasons. It is a striking common feature of most pieces of financial
advice that young investors are told to select relatively risky portfolios
in order to profit from the wealth-generating potential of the equity
premium.3 Older investors are told to rebalance and shift resources
into safer assets as they near retirement. While the advice stands
in contrast to the simple predictions of the classical theory presented
earlier it can be rationalized by taking the investor’s human capital or
human wealth into account. The following presentation of this argu-
ment builds upon the presentation in Campbell and Viceira (2001).
So far I have concentrated on the household’s financial wealth and
abstracted from labor income. While this is valid only for institutional
investors most households receive periodic income flows, transfers or
pension benefits. If one considers the expected present discounted
value of future income as an asset – call it human wealth – current
income flows can be interpreted as dividend payments on the implicit
holdings of that asset. In contrast to most financial assets human
wealth is not easily tradable. In the absence of slavery a person who
has sold claims against her future labor income cannot be forced to
continue working. Hence, moral hazard problems render human wealth
nontradable.
The household can anticipate future income streams and calculate
her human wealth HW as the present discounted value of future labor
income. The model in section 2.2 can be extended by human wealth
by noting that total wealthW is simply the sum of financial wealth Wˆ
and human wealth HW . Equation (2.14) still determines the optimal
portfolio shares such that the optimal holdings of asset i amount to
αi(Wˆ + HW ). Portfolio shares, however, are generally expressed as
the part of financial wealth that is accorded to a particular asset, αˆ.
The optimal shares for the financial portfolio can be calculated as
αˆi =
αi(Wˆ +HW )
Wˆ
= αi
(
1 +
HW
Wˆ
)
> αi . (3.1)
In order to reach the optimal allocation of total wealth the explicit
asset holdings are adjusted to compensate for implicit holdings of hu-
man wealth. As a result, the optimal financial portfolio is tilted to-
3Cf. Canner, Mankiw, and Weil (1997).
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ward risky assets in the presence of risk-free labor income. This effect
is stronger the larger the ratio of human wealth to financial wealth.
Intuitively, the investor who already holds most of her total wealth
in safe assets – by her implicit holdings of human wealth – optimally
shifts a larger part of her financial wealth into risky assets. Optimal
portfolio shares are thus tilted toward stocks for investors who hold
risk-free, non-tradable human wealth.
The ratio of human wealth to financial wealth changes over the life
cycle. An employed young investor still expects many years of future
labor income and typically disposes of little financial wealth. Human
wealth might even increase during the first few years of the work life;
the investor comes closer to her high income years such that the high
earnings are discounted for less years. However, human wealth peaks
early in life and then falls and reaches zero when the investor dies.4
Financial wealth in the denominator should be increasing with age
until retirement. The ratio of human wealth to financial wealth in
equation (3.1) thus falls over the life cycle and only rebounces only
late in life.
Hence, a young investor should optimally accord a larger fraction
of her financial wealth to risky assets than an older investors even if the
level of financial wealth and risk characteristics are identical. Note the
this model leads to a prediction that is the exact opposite of the result
in Flavin and Yamashita (2002). Particularly young household are ex-
pected to show the corner solution of αˆ equal to one – i.e. full exposure
to the stock market – in the presence of borrowing constraints.
Future earnings cannot be predicted with certainty. However, it
can be shown that all employed investors should optimally tilt their
portfolios toward risky assets under the assumption of idiosyncratic
labor income risk. The higher the variance of labor income the less
pronounced this tilt becomes. If labor income is positively correlated
with asset returns the effect reverses and the investor optimally reduces
her exposure to risky assets compared to a situation with risk-free labor
income. In that case the implicit holdings of human wealth bear more
resemblance to a risky asset and are thus compensated by shifting
4One could argue that human wealth reaches zero at retirement if public pension
benefits are seen as annuities that depend on earlier contributions to the public
pension system or if the retirees rely entirely on private pensions.
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funds to risk-free investments. A positive correlation of income and
return shocks can be a plausible assumption given that many investors
fail to diversify internationally or even among industries.5
Households can influence the value of their human wealth for ex-
ample by varying their future labor supply and by investments in ed-
ucation and career choices. The endogenous determination of the la-
bor supply is explored by Bodie, Merton, and Samuelson (1992) who
find that the additional margin of adjustment provides the household
with insurance against negative return shocks. That enables especially
younger households to take more risks in their financial investments.
A different argument can be made regarding the attitude toward
risk. In their study cite above Barsky, Juster, Kimball, and Shapiro
also construct age patterns of risk aversion. They find a hump shape
– low risk aversion, and thus high participation in the stock market,
among the young and the elderly, and a high aversion to risk in the
middle ages. According to Paxson (1990), however, those households
at risk of facing binding liquidity constraints and uncertain needs –
younger households – should invest more in safe and liquid assets. To
the same result leads another argument. It is sensible to expect ed-
ucation, experience and especially financial sophistication to increase
with age. For example, the simplifying assumption taken in King and
Leape (1987) that information about stockholding arrives exogenously
and randomly over time implies that the probability of stockholding
increases in age. Hence, older investors are prone to show higher mar-
ket participation rates and more diversification in their portfolios.
It will soon be clear that the empirical evidence stands in striking
contrast to the first two arguments. Younger households do not hold
higher conditional portfolio shares in risky assets and, more impor-
tantly, they participate in the stock market to a much lower degree.
Education. The impact of education on investment decisions can be
understood in terms of informational requirements. It can be argued
that the investment in risky assets requires the investor to gather more
information on expected returns, the risk characteristics and eventual
institutional peculiarities like tax treatments. If a higher level of educ-
tion enables the household to fulfill the informational requirements
5Cf. discussion in chapter six of Campbell and Viceira (2001).
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faster and at lower cost risky investments are relatively more attrac-
tive for the more educated. Put differently, poorly educated house-
holds might simply be unaware of the existence of a particular asset
class.6 Guiso and Japelli (2002) construct an index of financial infor-
mation simply by counting the number of different assets known by
the household head and find that the index is highly correlated with
asset market participation.
3.2 Empirical findings
Participation Rates. One of the most persistent findings of the
empirical literature is the fact that many households do not hold risky
assets at all. For instance, Bertaut and Starr-McCluer (2002) report
that – despite the upward trend in participation (Table 3.1) – for more
than half of all U.S. households the only financial asset held is a savings
or checking account.
The household’s wealth has a very strong influence on the partici-
pation decision in that wealthier households show much higher partic-
ipation rates. Comparing participation in risky financial assets for dif-
ferent quartiles of the wealth distribution Guiso, Haliassos, and Japelli
(2002) report astonishing numbers as can be seen in Table 3.2.7 The
vast majority of households in the richest quartile hold risky finan-
cial assets. At the lower end of the wealth distribution less than five
percent of the households hold stocks directly or indirectly.
A robust finding of many empirical studies is a hump-shaped age
profile of participation in risky assets which can be found in Table
3.3. Participation is low among the young, rises with age, peaks in the
50-59 age bracket and declines during retirement.
Portfolio composition. With regard to portfolio shares conditional
on participation empirical studies identify similar determinants as for
the participation decision. Their effects are far less marked, though.
6King and Leape (1987) report that 40 percent of non-stockholders in the Survey
of Consumer Financial Decisions stated as a reason that they did not know enough
about the stock market.
7The first three panels report the proportion of investors by gross financial
wealth quartiles. The last panel reports the proportion of investors by total asset
quartiles.
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Table 3.1: Proportion of households investing in risky assets
Year
1983 1989 1995 1998
Direct stockholding 19.1 16.8 15.2 19.2
Direct and indirect stockholding n.a. 31.6 40.4 48.9
Risky financial assets n.a. 31.9 40.6 49.2
Total risky assets n.a. 46.4 51.6 56.9
Source: Guiso, Haliassos, and Japelli (2002)
Table 3.2: Proportion of households investing in risky assets, by asset quartiles
Quartile Top
I II III IV 5%
Direct stockholding 1.4 6.9 20.6 47.9 70.1
Direct and indirect stockholding 4.4 38.3 66.0 86.7 93.7
Risky financial assets 4.4 38.6 66.4 87.2 93.8
Total risky assets 15.4 48.0 70.8 93.2 98.8
Source: Guiso, Haliassos, and Japelli (2002)
Table 3.3: Proportion of households investing in risky assets, by age
Age
20-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 60-69 70+
Direct stockholding 11.8 16.0 21.2 24.8 23.7 18.2
Dir. and ind. stockh. 34.3 51.8 58.3 61.4 47.1 32.4
Risky financial assets 34.5 51.8 58.5 61.5 47.9 33.4
Total risky assets 38.7 58.6 67.0 68.4 59.2 42.4
Source: Guiso, Haliassos, and Japelli (2002)
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Wealthier households hold a larger part of their portfolio in risky
financial assets (Table 3.4). However, when controlling for other house-
hold characteristics the effect largely disappears and the residual can
easily be accounted for with theories of decreasing relative risk aversion
or economies of scale in portfolio management.
The age profile for conditional asset shares is one of the more con-
troversial questions in the empirical literature. Many studies detect a
hump-shape for the share of risky assets in the portfolio over the life
cycle, a pattern that can also be found in Table 3.5. However, that
hump is generally rather flat.
Housing Stock and Debt. Flavin and Yamashita (2002) report life
cycle patterns of asset holdings for home-owners. Table 3.6 illustrates
that the youngest home-owners under age 30 are highly leveraged with
a housing value to net worth ratio of 3.5.8 The ratio falls over the life
cycle as the household accumulates wealth. A similarly clear pattern
is evident for the ratio of mortgage to net wealth. Note that the
figures point to the existence of a down payment requirement in the
financing of home equity. One might even be tempted to find support
for the notion of a credit constraint used in my model in Chapter 4:
the constraint becomes more stringent the older the investor becomes.
The total mortgage is well below the value of the house, the ratio of
the two falling significantly with age.9
Debt can also appear as unsecured consumer credit. Despite the
higher borrowing costs many households especially younger ones take
on substantial amounts of consumer credit. Davis, Ku¨bler, and Willen
(2005) present evidence that 74 percent of U.S. households have at least
one credit card with 44 percent of all households showing a positive
balance after the most recent repayment in 1995.
8Mean asset-to-net worth ratio of home-owners in the 1989 PSID Wealth Data.
9This is only intended as a back-of-the-envelope calculation. The figures repre-
sent cohort means and cannot be aggregated that easily.
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Table 3.4: Conditional asset shares, by asset quartiles
Quartile Top
I II III IV 5%
Direct stockholding 32.9 33.0 25.6 34.9 37.9
Direct and indirect stockholding 40.7 45.0 49.0 60.4 64.0
Risky financial assets 40.7 44.9 49.0 61.3 65.2
Total risky assets 29.5 24.8 23.4 59.2 69.4
Source: Guiso, Haliassos, and Japelli (2002)
Table 3.5: Conditional asset shares, by age
Age
20-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 60-69 70+
Direct stockholding 22.5 28.3 29.4 32.7 37.5 41.3
Dir. and ind. stockh. 52.0 53.4 61.0 61.4 60.8 57.9
Risky financial assets 52.1 53.7 61.8 62.1 61.4 59.4
Total risky assets 44.4 43.0 52.9 58.8 56.2 56.1
Source: Guiso, Haliassos, and Japelli (2002)
Table 3.6: Ratio of house value and mortgage to net worth
Age
18-30 31-40 41-50 51-60 61-70 71+
House value 3.511 2.366 1.588 0.969 0.757 0.648
Mortgage 2.833 1.671 0.882 0.319 0.171 0.038
Source: Flavin and Yamashita (2002)
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As illustrated above there are substantial differences in the patterns
of participation rates and portfolio composition. The often cited fac-
tors wealth, age, and education exert their influence mainly at the
preliminary stage where the household decides whether to invest in a
risky asset class at all. However, classical theory concentrates on the
optimal allocation of funds between safe and risky assets given that
both are held. What needs to be explained, though, is the concave
age profile of participation in risky assets as well as the positive cor-
relation between participation and the two determinants wealth and
education.
Haliassos and Bertaut (1995) show that expected-utility maximiz-
ers should always be willing to hold an arbitrarily small amount in-
vested in the risky asset. Intuitively, an investor optimizes not only
along the consumption - savings margin, but also along the portfo-
lio margin. What matters for the risk and return trade-off is not the
asset’s idiosyncratic risk, but its covariance with the marginal utility
of consumption and at zero stockholdings stocks have zero covariance
with u′(Ct+1). In the following paragraphs I present a handful of
promising extensions to the basic model that may help to reconcile
the observed low participation rates among the young with classical
portfolio choice theory.
Participation Costs. One promising way to reconcile theoretical
models with the data lies in the introduction of participation costs.
Those costs can come along as monetary transaction costs, minimum
investment requirements, or information costs and what really matters
are the perceived rather than the actual costs.
First, monetary transaction costs arise for stock investments and
investments in mutual funds in the form of entry and liquidation, or
brokerage fees.10 Significant reductions generally apply only to very
large investments. Note that these costs are variable and thus do not
10Haliassos and Bertaut (1995) cite Aiyagari and Gertler (1990) who report
the following retail broker fees with discount brokers charging 30-70 percent less:
minimum counselling charges of $30-50 and inversely proportional fees in the order
of 2-8 percent. It is reasonable to assume a further decline in fees until today.
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fit well to the fixed costs of equity market participation that are of-
ten used to achieve realistic participation rates among the young and
the less wealthy. Second, there are minimum investment requirements
which can here do a better job. Households with low financial wealth
can well be deprived of the possibility to invest in equity if their desired
stockholdings are smaller than the minimum investment requirement.
Haliassos and Bertaut (1995), for instance, consider minimum invest-
ment requirements of $500 realistic. Third, the future investor may
well experience disutility when looking for a broker, opening an ac-
count, and more importantly when searching for information concern-
ing the potential gains and losses of a particular asset. It is reasonable
to expect the informational costs to be relatively high for individual
stock investments and a little less so for mutual funds.
Information costs are lower for the better educated, if education
is a good proxy for the ability to collect and process information. An
interesting point is made by Guiso and Japelli (2002): if participa-
tion costs only consisted of monetary costs and minimum investment
requirements, households at the very top of the wealth distribution
should hold efficient portfolios. However, that is not the case in most
countries. While the proportion of households in the richest quartile
holding stocks directly or indirectly is indeed very high in the U.S.,
the numbers are less promising for other countries with only 41.6 per-
cent in Germany and 54.6 percent in Italy.11 Information costs are not
necessarily correlated with wealth and might therefore explain why so
many rich households do not invest in risky assets.
Liquidity Needs. First, liquidity needs can lead to interesting ef-
fects when considered together with participation costs. In the case of
entry costs – as with mutual fund investments – the annual expected
cost is smaller the longer the investment horizon. Hence, investors
with short-term liquidity needs are less likely to pay the participation
cost. Liquidity needs are typically high for households with uncertain
needs or for those who face binding liquidity constraints, which both
applies particularly to young households. Moreover, the argument also
applies to the young who intend to purchase a home and save for the
11Cf. Guiso, Haliassos, and Japelli (2002).
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required down payment.12
Second, liquidity constraints can have effects on their own. In
his seminal empirical study on the effect of liquidity constraints on
consumption behavior Zeldes (1989) notes that a liquidity constraint
need not bind in order to affect current behavior. If the constraint
binds with some positive probability consumption will be lower for
any risk-averse individual. The desire to hold positive amounts of
nonhuman wealth has been coined precautionary savings.
Interest Rate Wedge. Davis, Ku¨bler, and Willen (2005) explore
the life cycle effects of an interest rate wedge, a borrowing rate that
exceeds the risk free interest rate. They present evidence of a bor-
rowing rate that exceeds the risk free return by about six to nine
percentage points. In their life cycle simulation the demand for eq-
uity is minimized if the borrowing rate equals the expected return
on equity. In that case no investor borrows to buy equity. A lower
borrowing rate induces investors to hold a debt-financed portfolio. A
higher borrowing rate on the other hand discourages borrowing for
consumption-smoothing purposes which leads households to reach a
positive financial position earlier and hold more equity in later ages.13
Their simulation matches observed life-cycle patterns for both equity
holdings and unsecured borrowing. However, it does not achieve realis-
tic bond portfolios. As Haliassos and Bertaut (1995) note, households
that are pushed to the corner solution of no stockholdings necessarily
show zero holdings in the risk free asset, too.
Laibson, Repetto, and Tobacman (2001) study the surprising coex-
istence of cheap collateralized and expensive non-collateralized debt.
They propose dynamically inconsistent time preferences as a solution
to the finding that many households accumulate large holdings of illiq-
uid assets while paying high interest on their revolving credit card
debt.
12Cf. Guiso and Japelli (2002).
13A higher borrowing rate makes debt-financed equity positions unattractive.
Hence, at younger ages a borrowing rate that exceeds the expected equity return
can lead to lower equity holdings.

Chapter 4
The Model
4.1 Setup of the Model
Preferences. In my model, the household gains instantaneous util-
ity from nondurable consumption and housing services. While the
former need to be purchased anew in every period housing services
depend on the real stock of housing that the household owns in the
period of interest. The underlying relation is very simple: the house-
hold receives one unit of housing services for every unit of housing
owned. The units could be interpreted as a function of the dwelling’s
properties such as size and quality. I use a standard CRRA utility func-
tion for the composite good and a Cobb-Douglas function to aggregate
current consumption and housing services. The weight parameter φ
determines preferences toward consumption and housing services. θ
denotes the curvature parameter.1 I abstract from a bequest motive
in order to concentrate on the direct effect of housing. The household
discounts the future using a constant factor β ≤ 1.
u(Ct,Ht) =
(
Cφt H
1−φ
t
)1−θ
1− θ (4.1)
1In the presence of illiquid housing as an additional state variable the coefficient
of relative risk aversion is no longer identical to the curvature parameter θ. In this
model risk attitude is state-dependent and the coefficient of relative risk aversion is
not necessarily constant. See Flavin and Nakagawa (2004) for an in-depth discus-
sion. However, I still describe the utility function as CRRA as this term is generally
used for a function of this particular form.
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Demographics. As this model abstracts from overlapping genera-
tions aspects I do not need separate indices for cohorts and age. Hence,
I set t equal to one when the household enters the model. The house-
hold works until Tˆ which I assume to be exogenous and deterministic
and leaves the model at age T . When solving the model for optimal be-
havior, however, I follow Hubbard, Skinner, and Zeldes (1994) and in-
clude age-specific conditional survival probabilities where pit stands for
the probability that a household who reached age t is still alive at age
t+ 1. Those affect the age-specific discount factor that the household
uses to aggregate current and future utility. Given the assumptions
concerning the individual discount factor and the conditional survival
probabilities the expected discounted lifetime utility becomes
U0 = E
[ T∑
t=1
βt
( t∏
j=1
pij
)
u(Ct,Ht)
]
(4.2)
Labor income. The household receives an exogenous stream of la-
bor income Ykt in each period of her working life. That income stream
depends on two factors, a deterministic wage profile that incorporates
the effects of age, ability and education, f(t, Zkt), and a stochastic
component ukt. In order to keep the computation feasible I abstract
from the often used separation of the stochastic component in per-
manent and transitory shocks as well as aggregate and idiosyncratic
shocks.2 Instead, I model the stochastic part of labor income as an
idiosyncratic lognormal i.i.d shock.
Ykt = f(t, Zkt) exp
{
ukt
}
for t < Tˆ (4.3)
ukt ∼ N(0, σ2u) (4.4)
During retirement, i.e. after age Tˆ , the household receives a risk-
free pension. Again for simplicity I assume the pension to be deter-
ministic and independent of an individual’s prior earning shocks.
Ytk = ϑk for t > Tˆ (4.5)
2Campbell and Viceira (2001), for instance, model log income as f(t, Zkt) +
vkt + ukt where the first part of the stochastic component, vkt, follows an AR(1)
process.
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Housing Stock. Housing plays a dual role in this model. It is both
a durable consumption good and a vehicle for investment. The house-
hold receives housing services to an amount that is directly propor-
tional to the size of the current housing stock.3 In each period a
fraction δ of the stock is lost due to wear and tear. Moreover, housing
is an investment good with uncertain capital value P which is a rela-
tive price that represents the price of one unit of housing in terms of
consumption goods. Note that the house price P does not affect the
amount of housing services that a given stock of housing generates.
The services depend exclusively on the stock’s size. For computational
reasons that I elaborate on in Chapter 5 the house price is introduced
as a stochastic process with a deterministic exponential trend.
Pt = exp
{
gt+ ηt
}
(4.6)
The return to housing is twofold. First, housing services yield
instantaneous utility and can thus be seen as a dividend on the cu-
mulated housing investment. Second, the housing price follows the
process given in (4.6) from which the financial return on housing can
be calculated as
Rht = log
{
Pt
}− log{Pt−1}
= g + ηt − ηt−1
= g +∆ηt . (4.7)
Housing in this model should not be seen as an investment in a
diversified real estate fund that can be bought and sold at low cost. It
rather refers to the household’s primary residence and is thus traded
as a single piece. Housing is severely illiquid. When adjusting the
housing stock the household has to sell her old property, incurring a
transaction cost that amounts to λ times the old house’s current value
PH−1. Denote the gross investment in the housing stock by PIH .
Hence, the quantity of housing owned is determined by
Ht =
{
(1− δ)Ht−1 for IHt = 0
(1− λ)(1− δ)Ht−1 + IHt for IHt 6= 0 .
(4.8)
3Quality improvements of the house appear simply as enlargements of the hous-
ing stock. Depreciation also affects solely the size of the stock.
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Financial Assets. There are three financial instruments in this model
– stocks, bonds and a mortgage. The household can invest nonnega-
tive amounts in stocks which yield the stochastic return Rs and the
risk free asset, bonds, that has a certain return Rf . The sum of stocks
and bonds determines the household’s liquid assets that I will call A.
The third instrument is a mortgage, D, which requires fixed interest
payments Rd−1 in every period. One can express the current holdings
of each asset in relation to liquid assets A by αi for i ∈ {s, f, d}. I rule
out short-sales in all three assets.
αs ≥ 0 (4.9)
αf ≥ 0 (4.10)
αd ≥ 0 (4.11)
The return on stocks is modeled as the sum of the risk-free return,
the expected excess return µ = E[Rs−Rf ] and a stochastic component
 ∼ N(0, σ2s). I allow  to be correlated with the stochastic element of
the housing return ∆η and denote the correlation by ρsh.4
Rst = R
f + µ+ t (4.12)
The maximum mortgage that the household is allowed to take out
depends on the value of the current housing stock. Real estate can
thus be financed with a loan except for the down payment, the frac-
tion κ of the house’s value that has to be paid upfront. Note that
I link the mortgage to the property’s value and not directly to the
investment in the housing stock – the additional resources that the
household receives by taking out a mortgage can be used for immedi-
ate consumption, financial investments or housing investments. The
mortgage can be renegotiated at no cost in every period. This assump-
tion is computationally attractive – the mortgage enters as a control
variable, but not as an additional state. This significantly reduces the
time needed for solving the model numerically. It is reasonable to ex-
pect tighter restrictions on borrowing by the elderly who face a higher
4Note that I hold financial investment opportunities constant over time. As
illustrated in Section 2.2 this constitutes an important assumption for standard
portfolio choice theory.
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mortality risk. Hence, I indexed the down payment fraction by t which
allows me to vary the constraint over the life cycle.
Dt ≤ (1− κt)PtHt (4.13)
Minimum Investment Requirement. The baseline model fea-
tures an important additional constraint, the minimum investment
requirement. In contrast to Cocco (2005) and many others I do not
impose a fixed financial cost of asset market participation. In his
framework, for instance, investors can access the stock market at no
cost for the rest of their lives once they have paid the upfront par-
ticipation cost. Hence, those costs can refer either to the monetary
entry fees that mutual fund ask for or to the monetary equivalent of
informational requirements, the time and effort of first-time investors
who have to reach a certain level of financial sophistication.
The minimum investment requirement does not involve a monetary
or utility cost for the investor. The constraint simply requires stock
investments to have a minimum size Ψ. This feature can of course be
institutional in the sense that brokers do not offer trades or depots
below a threshold. Moreover, households might simply believe that
it is impossible to buy shares in very low numbers or that the vari-
able utility costs of gathering information exceed the possible gains
from very small investments. As an additional computational benefit
I avoid including an additional state variable by chosing the minimum
investment requirement instead of the widely used fixed costs of equity
market participation.
Budget Constraint. The household begins each period with a level
of liquid wealth LW that depends on last period’s financial invest-
ments, the debt taken out, as well as the realization of the applicable
return process. Remember that A denotes liquid assets, the sum of
stocks and bonds. Rewriting the expression for liquid wealth will be
helpful below.
LWt+1 = StockstRst+1 +BondstR
f
t+1 −DtRdt+1
= At
(
Rft+1 + αs(R
s
t+1 −Rft+1)
)−DtRdt+1 (4.14)
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I follow Deaton (1991) and express cash-on-hand X as the sum of
liquid wealth and current labor income.
Xt+1 = LWt+1 + Yt+1 (4.15)
The household can use her resources which consist of cash on hand
and the debt taken out to purchase the nondurable consumption good,
to invest in the financial assets stocks and bonds, or to adjust her
housing stock.
Xt +Dt = At + Ct + PtIHt (4.16)
Combining (4.14), (4.15), and (4.16) leads to the household’s dy-
namic budget constraint, i.e.
Xt+1 =
(
Xt +Dt − Ct − PtIHt
)(
Rft+1 + αs(R
s
t+1 −Rft+1)
)
−DtRdt+1 + Yt+1 . (4.17)
4.2 The Household Problem
The household maximizes expected discounted lifetime utility subject
to the dynamic budget constraint, the law of motion for the housing
stock, the stochastic processes, and the constraints on the financial
instruments which have all been introduced in the previous section.
max
{Ct, Dt, αst , IHt }
U0 = E
[ T∑
t=1
βt
( t∏
j=1
pij
)
u(Ct,Ht)
]
(4.18)
The problem has three state variables, cash-on-hand Xt, last pe-
riod’s housing stock, Ht−1, and the current house price Pt. Let Vt
denote the household’s period t expectation of life-time welfare given
that the state variables take on the values Xt, Ht−1, and Pt and that
the policy rules for the controls Ct, Dt, αst and I
H
t are optimal for
the current and all future periods. The maximization problem can be
restated recursively using Bellman’s principle of optimality as
Vt(Xt,Ht−1, Pt) =
max
Ct, Dt, αst , I
H
t
{
u(Ct,Ht) + βpitEVt+1(Xt+1,Ht, Pt+1)
}
(4.19)
subject to
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laws of motion for the states
Xt+1 =At
(
Rft+1 + αs(R
s
t+1 −Rft+1)
)−DtRdt+1 + Yt+1 (4.20)
Ht =
{
(1− δ)Ht−1 for IHt = 0
(1− λ)(1− δ)Ht−1 + IHt for IHt 6= 0
(4.21)
the return, income and house price process
Yt =
{
f(t, Zt) exp
{
ut
}
for t ≤ Tˆ
ϑ for t > Tˆ
(4.22)
Pt =exp
{
gt+ ηt
}
(4.23)
Rst =R
f
t + µ+ t (4.24)
constraint 1: ‘credit constraint‘
Dt ≤
{
(1− κt)(1− δ)PtHt−1 for IHt = 0
(1− κt)Pt
(
(1− λ)(1− δ)Ht−1 + IHt
)
for IHt 6= 0
(4.25)
constraint 2: ‘nonnegative financial investments‘ 5
At = Xt +Dt − Ct − PtIHt ≥ 0 (4.26)
constraint 3: ‘no short sales for stocks‘
αst ≥ 0 (4.27)
constraint 4: ‘no short sales for bills‘
αst ≤ 1 (4.28)
constraint 5: ‘minimum investment requirement‘
αst =
{
αst for α
s
t ≥ Ψ/At
0 for αst < Ψ/At
(4.29)
In every period the household has to decide whether to adjust the
housing stock to its optimal level, i.e. she has to determine whether the
gains from correcting the housing stock justify paying the transaction
costs λPtHt−1.
5This constraint may seem redundant given that short sales are excluded in both
stocks and bonds. However, αs and αf are also positive if both, stocks and bonds,
are held in negative amounts in which case total financial investments become
negative.
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4.3 Calibration
I have not tried to estimate key parameters from original data my-
self. Instead, I rely on given estimates that are already more or less
widely used in models that study portfolio selection over the life cy-
cle. As most researchers concentrate on the U.S. my current calibra-
tion also uses estimates from that country. A natural extension of
this thesis would repeat the calculations using German or even better
multi-country OECD data.
Time. Households enter the model at age 20, work until age 65, and
leave the model at age 80. Each period in the model is calibrated to
correspond to five years which is done to reduce computation time.
All parameters are adjusted accordingly.
Preferences. In my baseline model I set the coefficient of relative
risk aversion θ to 5 and the intertemporal discount factor β to 0.95.
The weight housing carries in the instantaneous utility function is set
to 0.2 which approximately fits the average expenditure share accorded
to housing in the 2001 Consumer Expenditure Survey.6 The condi-
tional survival probabilities pit are taken from United Nations (2000).
Labor Income. In my specification of the labor income process I
follow Cocco, Gomes, and Maenhout (2005) who use a broad definition
of labor income in order implicitly allow for endogenous ways of self
insurance against pure labor income risk. They define labor income as
the sum of reported labor income, unemployment compensation, social
security, and other welfare and transfers such as help from relatives.
The deterministic life-cycle wage profiles f(t, Zkt) are taken from Altig,
Auerbach, Kotlikoff, Smetters, and Walliser (2001) who fit a third
degree polynomial for each of twelve groups which differ in the present
discounted value of total lifetime earnings.7 In the baseline model I
use the wage profile of Altig et al.’s median group for all households.
In a later variation I also study the effect of very low and very high
6Cf. Yao and Zhang (2005).
7Other studies such as Cocco, Gomes, and Maenhout (2005) use different wage
profiles for groups with differing educational attainment.
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Figure 4.1: Conditional survival probabilities
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Note: Conditional survival probabilities for five year peri-
ods from United Nations (2000).
earnings. In particular I simulate the model using the wage profile of
the second and the eleventh of Altig et al’s twelve groups – i.e. the
2nd to 8th percentile and the 90th to 98th percentile of the income
distribution.
The variance of the stochastic element of the labor income process
is derived from the model of Campbell and Viceira (2001) and set to
0.0111. In their specification the stochastic component is split in per-
manent and transitory parts. However, on their way to the final values
they first estimate the variance of the total innovation to detrended
log income. That number fits to my specification.8 As Campbell and
Viceira (2001) distinguish between three educational levels I use the
median value for the baseline case. In the variation with high and
low earning processes I use the standard deviation of the high and low
8Cf. Campbell and Viceira (2001), p. 208.
log (Yt)
∗ = log(Yt)− fˆ(t, Zkt) corresponds to ukt
var
`
log (Yt)
∗´ = σ2perm + 2σ2trans corresponds to σ2u
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education group. In order to normalize the shock to one, I set the
expected value to −σ2u/2.
Figure 4.2: Age-specific wage profile
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Note: Age-specific wage profile for low (2nd - 10th per-
centile), median, and high (90th - 98th) expected dis-
counted lifetime income groups taken from Altig, Auer-
bach, Kotlikoff, Smetters, and Walliser (2001).
There is a large literature on the results of nonzero correlation
between income and return shocks. The general argument has already
been presented in Section 3.1. However, in the remainder of this thesis
I will concentrate on the effect of housing and abstract from a nonzero
correlation of income and return shocks. During retirement, i.e. after
age Tˆ , the household receives the risk-free pension ϑ. I set the pension
to sixty percent of the household’s expected income in the last year
before retirement.
Financial Assets. I follow Cocco (2005) and parameterize the risk-
free interest rate to two percent and the mortgage rate to four percent.
In the data Cocco finds a higher mortgage premium of more than three
percent for the period of 1964 to 1997, but notes that this premium
overstates the applicable return. Part of the premium is paid for an
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implicit option on future inflation which is absent from my model as
well as from his. Hence, I also set the mortgage premium to two
percent. The excess return on stocks depends on two components.
First, there is the expected excess return, the equity premium, that I
set to four percent and hold fixed. That value is substantially lower
than the historical average of 7-8 percent, but a widely used number
in the literature.9 Second, there is a stochastic element. The annual
standard variation of the stochastic part is parameterized to 0.157 and
thus equal to the historical value of the Standard & Poors 500 Index
portfolio a number used e.g. by Campbell and Viceira (2001). The
correlation of housing and stock returns is set to zero in the baseline
model, but I try different values in later variations.
Housing. In the calibration of the house price process I follow again
Cocco (2005) in order to make my results comparable to his. He re-
ports a growth rate of log house prices of 0.016 per year and a standard
deviation of the detrended log house prices of 0.062 which corresponds
to a standard deviation of the housing return of 0.088.10 Cocco uses
self-assessed house values and finds a higher growth rate. However,
part of that price increase is due to improvements in the quality of the
property that cannot be accounted for in the data. In his and in my
model those improvements would appear as housing investments and
not as increases in the housing price. Hence, a lower growth rate is
used. I also follow him in setting the annual depreciation rate of the
housing stock one percent.
The transaction cost inherent in a house sale is set to eight percent
and the down payment to twenty percent. For households who are
older than 50 the credit constraint becomes tighter as lenders try to
insure their loans against mortality risk. I chose a simple variant
and increase the required down payment linearly until it reaches 1 at
age 80. Those are key parameters for the model as they determine
9Cf. Fama and French (2002).
10The standard deviation of detrended log house prices ση can easily be trans-
formed into the standard deviation of the housing return σ∆η using the following
formula.
var(Rh) = σ2∆η = 2σ
2
η
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important characteristics of the housing good, its illiquidity and its
role as a collateral. Naturally, I also calculate specifications with more
extreme values for the two parameters.
4.3 Calibration 43
Table 4.1: Parameters in baseline model
Parameter Value
Entry age 20
Maximum age (T ) 80
Retirement age (Tˆ ) 65
Curvature Parameter (θ) 5
Discount factor (β) 0.95
Housing’s weight in the utility function (1− φ) 0.2
Risk-free return (Rf ) 0.02
Mortgage rate (Rd) 0.04
Equity premium (µ) 0.04
Growth rate of log house price (g) 0.016
Depreciation rate of housing stock (δ) 0.01
Correlation of housing and stock returns (ρsh) 0
S.d. of idiosyncratic income shocks (σu) 0.105
S.d. of aggregate stock return shock (σ) 0.157
S.d. of aggregate detrended log house price (ση) 0.062
Minimum investment requirement (Ψ) 0.1
Transaction cost of house sale (λ) 0.08
Down payment until age 50 (κt≤50) 0.20
Down payment after age 50 (κt>50) grows linearly to 1
Pension benefits (ϑk) 0.6f(Tˆ , ZkTˆ )
Note: Figures in the table refer to annual values.

Chapter 5
Computation
5.1 Parameters and Shocks
Transformation of Annual Parameters. In order to reduce the
computational burden I solve the model for 12 periods each of which
corresponds to five years. Households enter the model in period 1
which lasts from age 20 to 24, retire after period 9 which lasts from
age 60 to 64 and leave the model after period 12, i.e. just when turning
80. As a result, I have to transform most parameters from the annual
values given in the calibration section to their five year equivalents.
From now on, the hat refers to the transformed parameters.
The transformation is straightforward for parameters like β and
Rd which are constant and not subject to any uncertainty. Hence, I
use βˆ = β5 and Rˆd = (1 + R)d 5 − 1. The conditional survival proba-
bilities in the model are the product of the five corresponding annual
probabilities, e.g. pˆit =
∏5t
i=5(t−1)+1 pii . The deterministic life cycle
wage profile is found by simply taking the mean of the corresponding
annual values, fˆ(t, Zkt) = 1/5
∑5t
i=5(t−1)+1 f(i, Zki) .
It is important to correct the stochastic shocks for the five-year
periods. The asset return shock can be transformed by adjusting the
standard deviation accordingly.1 The very simple (bootstrap) simu-
lation transform_shocks.m gives the following value for the baseline
1In the model the relevant stock return refers to an investor who adjusts her
portfolio every five years.
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case, σˆ = 0.0704.2
The house price is determined by the underlying deterministic ex-
ponential trend and the i.i.d. shock. The standard deviation of the
house price therefore does not change. The income process combines
an age-specific wage profile and an idiosyncratic shock that is uncor-
related over time. For the average income shock over the five year
horizon, the mean of the period income shocks, I find a standard devi-
ation of σˆu = 0.0468 using again the program transform_shocks.m.
Approximation of Shocks. I find the discretized distribution of
the idiosyncratic income shock using the function qnwnorm.m that
calculates nodes and weights for the approximation of normally dis-
tributed variables.3 I first approximate the logarithm of the shock
using five nodes and then calculate exp(ukt).
The house price is a state variable that I approximate with a deter-
ministic exponential trend and a shock that follows a two-state Markov
process which is calibrated to yield the standard deviation given above.
The deterministic exponential trend in the process of house prices al-
lows me to hold the size of the housing grid constant. This prevents
a decline in the model’s accuracy as households age. Imagine, for in-
stance, that I let the house price follow a random walk. In that case the
variance of house prices grows as the length of the horizon increases.
Even if the possible realizations of the innovation are set to the min-
imum value of two, the difference between the largest and smallest
possible house price grows over the life cycle and thereby reduces the
model’s accuracy at high age significantly for a given number of grid
points.
The stochastic part of the stock return shock also features two
possible realizations. The corresponding probabilities depend on the
realization of the house price state which allows me to introduce a cor-
relation between stock returns and house prices. There are altogether
ten possible combinations of the return and income shock. Using a
Kronecker product of the vectors that hold the individual weights I
can easily combine those two sources of uncertainty in the program.
2The Matlab code for this function and the entire program are available from
the author upon request, maxf@stanford.edu.
3The function is part of a toolbox by Paul L. Fackler and Mario J. Miranda.
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5.2 Optimal Policy Functions
Definition of the Grids. The problem can only be solved using
numerical techniques. Given the finite nature of the problem a solu-
tion exists and can be obtained by backward induction (Judd (1998)).
The state variables cash-on-hand X and last period’s housing H−1 are
approximated with equally spaced grids, x_grid and h_grid with n
grid points each. The third state variable, the current housing price
P , can only take on one of two values in every period. Hence, in each
period I have to solve the problem for n×n× 2 possible combinations
of the states.
I hold both the housing and the cash-on-hand grid constant. I
arbitrarily set Hmin equal to 0.01.4 For the cash-on-hand grid I find
the lowest possible value that a household’s cash on hand can take
on. This value that clearly makes the grid too large at the lower
rim. However, it avoids errors in the simulation as I determined the
grid size using approximated, discretized shocks. Extreme values in
the simulation can otherwise lead the household to jump out of the
specified grid. The maximum values for both grids were increased
every time that a household in the simulation reached the upper end
of the grid.
Xmin = Y min − (1 +Rd)(1− κmin)PmaxHmax (5.1)
The control variables C, D, IH , and α are also approximated with
equally spaced grids with m grid points each. Note that the grids
for D and IH are endogenous. The maximum housing disinvestment,
IH min, depends on the minimum housing stock that I require the
household to hold. I set the maximum housing investment exogenously
and increased it each time the upper bound was found to be an optimal
choice for the household. The mortgage can take on values between
zero and the maximum that is reached when the credit constraint
4I cannot set the minimum house size to zero. The resulting utility would also
be zero which cannot be transformed when I linearize the value function. Varying
the minimum housing stock does does not affect the results as long as the value
remains relatively small.
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binds.
IH mint = −Ht−1 +Hmin (5.2)
Dmaxt = (1− κt)PtHt . (5.3)
For each combination of cash-on-hand and the housing stock I rule
out the points at the lower end of the cash-on-hand grid that the
households cannot possibly reach without violating a constraint. The
condition is given by
Xmint ≥ PtIH mint −Dmaxt . (5.4)
This allows to reduce the computational burden significantly, but re-
duces the number of grid points especially at low levels of the hous-
ing stock. In earlier versions I experimented with an alternative ap-
proach and employed an endogenously determined grid for cash-on-
hand. However, the computational gain proved too small when weighted
against the additional complication of the program.
For each state I have to calculate the solution twice, once under the
assumption that the housing stock remains unchanged and once given
that the household optimizes over all control variables while paying
the applicable transaction cost. I then compare the resulting welfare
and choose the superior alternative. That results in n × n × 2 × 2
calculations.
The Last Period. I now summarize the solution technique in a few
sentences before describing it in more detail below. In every period I
calculate the utility associated with different choices of consumption,
housing investments, mortgage, and the investment strategy for liquid
assets. The value function is equal to the sum of the utility function
and – in all but the last period – the expected discounted continuation
value that is achieved given the chosen controls and the current states.
The choices that are ruled out by the constraints are given a very
large negative utility so that they are never chosen by the household.
I optimize over the different choices and then iterate backwards.
I begin in the last period of the household’s life, T , and calculate
the utility she derives from optimally allocating her resources, XT
and HT−1, given the current house price PT . As I abstract from a
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bequest motive and prevent the household from dying in debt I only
need to find the optimal consumption and housing investment policy.
I vectorize all possible combinations of CT and IHT and calculate the
resulting instantaneous utility which then allows me to find the optimal
behavior of the household. Since this is the last period the utility
function coincides with the value function, u(CT ,HT ) = VT . I then
compare the two solutions, for a fixed and for an adjusted housing
stock, and store the optimal policies and the resulting value function.
Figure 5.1: Value function
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Note: Value function in the oldest age bracket for different
values of the housing stock given that the house price takes
on the low realization. VjT (XT , HjT−1;P lowT )
For each realization of the house price the value function is highly
concave as is more than evident in Figure 5.1. I need to interpolate
on the value function when calling on the continuation value in the
optimization in the previous period. In order to increase the accuracy
of the interpolation I linearize the value function similar to Carroll
(2002a) and find ΛT . The transformation is imperfect as it ignores the
presence of housing. However, given the relatively small role housing
plays in the utility function, the large φ, the results seem to be rea-
sonably accurate. The transformed value function is shown in Figure
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5.2 which clearly allows a more accurate linear interpolation.5 The
flat region in the graph corresponds to combinations of the states that
the household cannot reach without violating a constraint that follows
from (5.4).
ΛT (XT ,HT−1;PT ) = −VT (XT ,HT−1;PT )
1
1−θ (5.5)
Figure 5.2: Transformed value function
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Note: Transformed value function for the oldest age bracket on the
two-dimensional grid spanned by x_grid and h_grid given that the
house price takes on the low realization. ΛT (XT , HT−1;P lowT )
Backward Induction. In the next to last period the household op-
timizes over all control variables knowing the expected continuation
value for all points on the two grids. For all combinations of the
states I again vectorize the problem. For each point on the grid
for housing investments, hinv_grid, the new housing stock HT−1
5Due to the specification of the utility function both utility and the value func-
tion are negative. Therefore, I have to multiply V with −1 before the transforma-
tion.
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and the maximal mortgage DmaxT−1 is calculated which then allows to
span the d_grid. For each combination of the two grids I append
the savings grid, s_grid, and calculate the resulting levels of con-
sumption which are simply the resources left-over in XT−1 +DT−1 =
CT−1 + PT−1IHT−1 + AT−1. In a final step, the grid for the allocation
of liquid assets among stocks and bills, alpha_grid, has to be added.6
The law of motion for cash-on-hand is then applied to each of the
resulting combinations of controls and all ten possible realizations of
the income and return shocks to find the associated values of next
period’s cash-on-hand, X˜iT , for i = 1, ...,m×m×m×m× 10.7
It has been illustrated above that the stochastic element of the
house price process is approximated with a two-state Markov process.
I therefore loop over both possible future values of the process and find
the continuation value of ∗T on the applicable grid for each value of
X˜iT and the corresponding value of H
i
T−1. In between the grid points
I use the standard function interp2.m and interpolate linearly. Of
course, the transformation of the value function needs to be reversed
before the household’s expectations over the income and return shocks
can be calculated. The expectations can then be found by multiplying
with the vector of the combined weights.8
EY,Rs
[VT (X˜iT ,H iT−1; P˜T )] = EY,Rs[−ΛT (X˜iT ,H iT−1; P˜T )1−θ] (5.6)
The current value function can be found as the sum of instanta-
neous utility and the expected discounted continuation value where
the expectation now also refers to the uncertain shock to the house
price. Again the expectation is easy to derive by multiplying with the
applicable row of the Markov transition matrix for the house price.9
V iT−1(XT−1,HT−2;PT−1) =
u(CiT−1,H
i
T−1) + βˆpˆiT−1EY,Rs,P
[VT (X˜iT ,H iT−1; P˜T )] (5.7)
6In the Matlab code the combinations of the control variables are stored in
the matrix X where the columns 1 to 6 hold the housing investment, the mortgage
taken, the investment in liquid assets, consumption, the share of stocks, and the
new housing stock.
7The associated values are stored in the vector Z.
8The expected continuation values conditional on next period’s house price are
stored in the matrix Q.
9The matrix Y holds the current utility in column 1, the expected continuation
value in column 2, and the current value in column 3.
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The optimal policy for each admissible combination of the states
refers to the combination of controls i that yields the highest welfare
in period T − 1.
VT−1(XT−1,HT−2;PT−1) = max
i
{V iT−1(XT−1,HT−2;PT−1)} (5.8)
The corresponding values of the control variables and the value
function are again stored on the grid spanned by h_grid and x_grid.
The same is done with the value function; however, the value function
first needs to be transformed as in (5.5). I then iterate backwards and
solve all previous periods in the same way.
The optimal policies for the baseline model have been calculated
using 25 grid points for the two states and 13 grid points for the control
variables. Together with the ten possible realizations of the discretized
income and asset return shock this results in 154 · 10 = 285, 610 calcu-
lations at 252 · 2 = 1250 combinations of the state variables for each
period. Altogether the computer runs for about eleven hours.
5.3 Simulation
This model concentrates on the demand of households for housing and
other assets over the life cycle. It abstracts form general equilibrium
aspects and does not incorporate any interaction of the households in
the model. The housing price, for instance, is taken as given and not
affected by the households allocation decisions. Hence, I do not have
to simulate multiple cohorts, but only follow one household at a time.
Having calculated the optimal policy functions it is straightforward
to simulate the behavior of individual households over the life cycle.
For each run of the simulation I draw realizations of the two aggregate
shocks, the asset return shock and the house price shock are identical
for all households in the simulation run. The idiosyncratic shocks,
though, are drawn individually for each household.
In the baseline model the household begins her adult life endowed
with a house of the minimum size but without any other resources in
the form of liquid assets. However, she does dispose of her current
labor income. Given the state variables, cash-on-hand which equals
the labor income in period one, the minimum housing stock and the
realization of the aggregate house price the households behavior can
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be found by calling on the optimal policy functions for consumption,
housing investments, debt, and asset allocation. This is again done
by two dimensional interpolation on the grid spanned by x_grid and
h_grid. Next period’s cash-on-hand and housing stock are calculated
using the laws of motion and the realizations of the shocks drawn
above. With those at hand the process can be repeated for the next
and all the following periods. Altogether I ran 20 simulations with 50
households each.

Chapter 6
Simulation Results
In this part I present and interpret the results of the simulation that
uses the baseline parameter constellation as introduced in Section 4.3.
After this I will highlight main results of alternate models that vary
slightly from this baseline case. The aim is to identify the key features
of the model, those features that eventually drive the results.
Heaton and Lucas (2000) use three definitions of households’ net
worth: ’liquid net worth’, the sum of stocks and bonds minus debt; ’fi-
nancial net worth’, liquid net worth plus the housing stock’s value; and
’total net worth’, the sum of financial net worth and human wealth.
Without the subtraction of debt the classifications refer to ’liquid as-
sets’, ’financial assets’, and ’total assets’.
6.1 The Baseline Model
One can easily calculate a household’s human wealth given the age-
specific wage profiles and the assumptions concerning the income pro-
cess and the public pension system. As before human wealth is simply
the expected present discounted value of future labor income and pen-
sion benefits. Following again Heaton and Lucas (2000) a constant
annual discount rate of five percent is applied.1 Figure 6.1 illustrates
human wealth over the life cycle for the median income group. Fig-
1A more precise calculation requires a risk-adjusted discount rate as the pension
benefit is risk-free whereas the labor income stream conveys an idiosyncratic risk
term.
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ure 6.2 shows the average realized paths of labor income and pension
benefits for several runs of the simulation. Not surprisingly, the id-
iosyncratic component of labor income almost cancels out over the 50
households.
Households’ average spending on the nondurable consumption good
increases with age and seems to jump up in the last period of life.
This surprising finding of Figure 6.3 can best be understood when
considered together with Figure 6.7. In addition to their nondurable
consumption households derive housing services from their durable
housing stock. That stock is high early in life, subsequently depreci-
ates, and falls significantly during retirement. The reason can be seen
in housing’s dual role. There are basically two incentives for holding
housing stock: the consumption and the investment motive. Late in
life, housing loses its role as an investment good until, in the very last
period, it is just another consumption good that the household can
spend her resources on. Hence, the household shifts resources away
from housing and into non-durable consumption late in life.2
As bequests are absent here households enter the model with zero
levels of housing stock, debt, and financial investments, but equipped
with their first labor income. Early in life, the two motives for holding
housing stock imply high housing investments (Figure 6.5). Adjust-
ments of the housing stock are infrequent for most part of the house-
holds’ lifespan as they are costly. Figure 6.6 shows that less than five
percent of the households move in each period between age 35 and 60.
Significant disinvestments do not occur before retirement when the
households begin do run down their financial savings as well as their
housing stock in order to finance nondurable consumption in excess of
their pension benefits. Average cash-on-hand (Figure 6.4) is relatively
high in the model’s starting period and then falls due to the invest-
ments in housing and the mortgage payments, but later rises when the
household accumulates more wealth.
Figures 6.7 and 6.8 illustrate the life cycle pattern of the absolute
housing stock and the housing stock’s value respectively. While the
housing stock is built up early in life, it then remains practically un-
touched and runs down as it is subject to depreciation. The value
2Of course, other arguments can be put forward for the decrease in average
house sizes among the elderly. A brief discussion can be found in Chapter 7.
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of the stock, however, increases over time as the house price’s trend
growth exceeds the depreciation rate. As already stated above, the
housing stock is reduced late in life.
Households take out high mortgages when they are young in order
to finance the investment in housing. Accordingly, about half of the
households face a binding credit constraint in the first period. Debt
levels (Figure 6.9) remain high – when the formerly credit constrained
households adjust their mortgage in the subsequent periods – and fall
later in life. The share of credit constrained households (Figure 6.10)
increases again after retirement when the credit constraint becomes
tighter as specified in the calibration section. Figure 6.11 shows savings
that are invested into liquid assets, i.e. stocks and bonds. A clear
hump shape is more than evident.
Figure 6.12 and 6.13 show average asset holdings and net worth
for all three definitions introduced above. Note that the liquid net
worth positions remain negative for the first half of most households’
lifespan. Financial and total assets include the housing stock and thus
do not fall to zero in the last period.
While average stock holdings also follow a clear hump shape, bonds
are only held during the first and the last periods. Interestingly, this
result is mainly driven by the stock market participation decision (Fig-
ure 6.16) as households who do participate in the stock market gener-
ally accord all their savings to risky stock investments. Many young
investors, however, spend most of their available resources on hous-
ing investments and thus do not reach the threshold introduced by
the minimum investment requirement. Similar to the ’housing con-
straint’ in Flavin and Yamashita (2002) the importance of the housing
stock relative to financial assets decreases over the life cycle and only
increases late in life when households run down their total financial
assets while keeping part of their housing stock because of the con-
sumption motive.
In Cocco’s model (2005) the participation rate does not fall later in
life – a difference that is due to the fixed cost of participation that, once
payed, allow investors access to the stock market for the remainder of
their lives. Here, I instead assumed a minimum investment require-
ment that prevents very low stock investments without imposing a
direct monetary or a utility cost. The minimum investment require-
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ment becomes again binding for a large share of the investors during
retirement when financial savings are run down.
A second reason for lower risk taking in the financial portfolio at
high age results from the human wealth argument presented in chapter
2. Capitalized labor income is the dominant component of total wealth
for the young (Figure 6.19), but less important for older investors
whose tilt in the financial portfolio toward risky assets is thus lower.3
3A further motive for lower risky asset shares during retirement can be seen
in the higher business risk faced especially by relatively old and wealthy investors.
This, however, is absent from my model. See Heaton and Lucas (2000).
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Figure 6.1: Human wealth
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Note: Capitalized labor income and pension benefits for the me-
dian income group using a constant discount rate of five percent.
Figure 6.2: Labor income and pension benefits
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Note: Noncapital income, i.e. labor income streams and pension
benefits, normalized to one in the first period.
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Figure 6.3: Consumption
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Note: Average simulated consumption normalized by the expected
labor income in the first period, i.e. at age 20-25.
Figure 6.4: Cash-on-hand
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Note: Average simulated cash-on-hand normalized by the expected
labor income in the first period, i.e. at age 20-25.
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Figure 6.5: Housing investment
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Note: Average simulated gross housing investment normalized by
the expected labor income in the first period, i.e. at age 20-25.
Figure 6.6: Share of households moving
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Note: Average simulated share of households that adjust their
housing stock in each period.
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Figure 6.7: Housing stock
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Note: Average simulated absolute housing stock normalized by the
expected labor income in the first period, i.e. at age 20-25.
Figure 6.8: Value of the housing stock
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Note: Average simulated housing stock in terms of the consump-
tion good normalized by the expected labor income in the first
period, i.e. at age 20-25.
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Figure 6.9: Debt
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Note: Average simulated mortgage normalized by the expected
labor income in the first period, i.e. at age 20-25.
Figure 6.10: Share of credit constrained households
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Note: Average share of households that are credit constrained in
each period.
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Figure 6.11: Savings
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Note: Average savings (A) that are invested in stocks or bonds
normalized by the expected labor income in the first period.
Figure 6.12: Asset holdings
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Note: Average holdings of liquid (A), financial (A+PH), and total
assets (A+ PH +HW ) normalized by the expected labor income
in the first period, i.e. at age 20-25.
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Figure 6.13: Net worth
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Note: Average liquid (A−D), financial (A+ PH −D), and total
net worth (A+PH +HW −D) normalized by the expected labor
income in the first period, i.e. at age 20-25.
Figure 6.14: Stock holdings
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Note: Average stock holdings normalized by the expected labor
income in the first period, i.e. at age 20-25.
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Figure 6.15: Bond holdings
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Note: Average bond holdings normalized by the expected labor
income in the first period, i.e. at age 20-25.
Figure 6.16: Stock market participation rate
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Note: Share of households that participate in the stock market in
each period.
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Figure 6.17: Portfolio allocation – liquid assets
20 30 40 50 60 70
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1  
as
se
t s
ha
re
s
stocks
bonds
Note: Allocation of liquid assets among stocks and bonds in each
period.
Figure 6.18: Portfolio allocation – financial assets
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Note: Allocation of financial assets among liquid assets, housing,
and debt in each period.
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Figure 6.19: Portfolio allocation – total assets
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Note: Human wealth, housing, and debt as shares of total assets
in each period.
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6.2 Alternative Models
Credit Constraint. In order to illustrate the role played by the
mortgage contract I set the parameter κ equal to one in an alternative
specification. This implies a down payment of one hundred percent or
– as households cannot sell bonds short – the plain absence of debt.
In the baseline model households generally acquire a relatively large
house early in life in order to reduce the number of costly future house
trades. Here, they cannot partially finance that investment with a
mortgage. Hence, housing investments are lower in the first period,
but the average adjustment does not drop down to zero by age 30
as in the baseline model. Instead, households continue to accumulate
housing stock until age 50 as can be seen in Figure 6.20. As a corol-
lary, the share of moving households remains high for much longer.
Households are prevented from borrowing against future labor income
or the housing stock for financing not only housing investments, but
also stock and bond investments. This results in significantly lower
financial investments which Figure 6.21 illustrates. Accordingly, many
investors reach the minimum investment later than before. The lag in
stock market participation is evident in the life cycle pattern (Figure
6.22).
To the other extreme I simulate the model without a down pay-
ment requirement which allows households to borrow up to the value
of their house. Not surprisingly, the simulation yields results that am-
plify the difference between the ’no debt financing’ and the baseline
case. Households immediately choose the desired house size in the first
period as they are unconstrained. Financial savings are higher and less
investors fail to reach the minimum investment requirement.
Minimum Investment Requirement. I have already elaborated
on the interaction between housing, the credit constraint, and the
minimum investment requirement. Young homeowners have are credit
constrained and show low financial savings due to their investments in
the housing stock. As a result, many do not reach the minimum invest-
ment requirement and thus do not hold stocks at all. In an alternate
calculation I have solved the identical model without costs of asset
market participation. The results illustrate the important role by the
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this market friction. While savings remain approximately unchanged,
investors now hold all their liquid assets in stocks a prediction that
is clearly at odds with the evidence. Stockholdings double among the
young and they are still 25 percent higher at age 45. Stocks form
a significantly larger part of financial assets during the first half of
households’ lives (6.23).
Transaction Costs in Housing Market. Another variation of the
baseline model features housing as a liquid investment good. While
houses are still traded as a whole, there are no longer transaction
costs that the seller incurs. It is reasonable to expect that housing
becomes more attractive in this setting. In the first period, however,
households now invest slightly less in the housing stock. In the baseline
model the housing in the first period not only reflects the consumption
and investment motive, but also the attempt to reduce the number of
future house trades. By acquiring a house that is ‘too big’, young
households prevent subsequent, costly adjustments when their desire
for housing grows along with their wealth. Here, those adjustments
are free and the average housing stock consequently grows until age
45 and is significantly larger than in the baseline model (Figure 6.24).
At the same time, households now hold more leveraged portfolios and
achieve levels of financial net worth that exceed those in the baseline
case by about ten percent.
House Risk. In order to study the effects of house price risk on
household portfolios I also solve the model with a deterministic housing
price. Contrary to my own expectation the average housing stock does
not rise which might at first seem to be a puzzle. Note, however,
that housing is an important share of total wealth especially late in
life. Hence, an uncertain housing price can have very strong effects
among felicity among the elderly. Now, without that source of risk,
households no longer need to hold extra high levels of housing stock
in order to cushion the possible losses. Accordingly, consumption rises
among the young who now save less, both in terms of liquid assets
and housing investments. Investors reach the minimum investment
requirement later than before and absolute stockholdings are lower
(Figure 6.25). At first sight, this prediction stands in stark contrast
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with Cocco’s finding that house price risk crowds out stockholdings.
In the ‘no house price risk’ variant of his model he reports a higher
share of financial assets that is allocated to stocks. This also holds
in my model. However, the share only rises because of the significant
decline in financial assets, the denominator (Figure 6.26. This does
not appear in Cocco’s presentation.
Income Risk. An increase in idiosyncratic labor income risk does
not yield any surprising results. Households now save more when
young in order to insure themselves against negative income shocks.
When approaching retirement the effect reverses. Pension benefits are
risk free such that the setting then resembles the baseline case more
and more. The higher savings in earlier periods now allow higher levels
of consumption and lower savings (6.27).
Stock Return Risk. Stock investments become less attractive when
I increase the standard deviation of returns. Hence, households save
less of their resources for financial investments, they participate in the
stock market later in life and thus accumulate wealth slower. Stock-
holdings decrease (Figure 6.28 and the financial net worth is lower
especially in the second half of their lives.
Return Correlation. In the baseline model the correlation between
stock and housing returns is zero. This assumption corresponds to the
finding of, for instance, Flavin and Nakagawa (2004).4 When simu-
lating the model with a positive correlation I find that asset demand
decreases. Stocks no longer provide a reasonable hedge for the house
price risk and become less attractive investments. While the share of
financial assets that is accorded to stocks hardly falls at all, there is a
significant drop in absolute stockholdings (6.29). The reduced absolute
level of financial assets again hides the effect when only the portfolio
composition is considered.
4Other researchers highlight the possible positive correlation between housing
prices and income shocks which emphasis on regional correlation. Unfortunately, I
cannot easily include this in my model.
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Figure 6.20: Housing stock – ’no debt financing’
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Note: Average simulated absolute housing stock normalized by the
expected labor income in the first period, i.e. at age 20-25.
Figure 6.21: Financial savings – ’no debt financing’
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Note: Average savings (A) that are invested in stocks or bonds in
each period normalized by the expected labor income in the first
period, i.e. at age 20-25.
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Figure 6.22: Stock market participation– ’no debt financing’
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Note: Share of households that participate in the stock market in
each period.
Figure 6.23: Stocks as share of financial assets – ’no minimum investment re-
quirement’
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Note: Stocks as share of financial assets in the baseline model and
in the variation without a minimum investment requirement.
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Figure 6.24: Housing stock – ’no transaction costs’
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Note: Absolute housing stock in the baseline model and the vari-
ation with costless house trades normalized by the expected labor
income in the first period, i.e. at age 20-25.
Figure 6.25: Stockholdings – ’no house price risk’
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Note: Stockholdings in the baseline model and in the variation
without house price risk normalized by the expected labor income
in the first period, i.e. at age 20-25.
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Figure 6.26: Financial Assets – ’no house price risk’
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Note: Financial assets in the baseline model and in the variation
without house price risk normalized by the expected labor income
in the first period, i.e. at age 20-25.
Figure 6.27: Savings – ’high labor income risk’
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Note: Savings in the baseline model and in the variation with high
labor income risk normalized by the expected labor income in the
first period, i.e. at age 20-25.
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Figure 6.28: Stockholdings – ’high stock return risk’
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Note: Stockholdings in the baseline model and in the variation with
high stock return risk normalized by the expected labor income in
the first period, i.e. at age 20-25.
Figure 6.29: Stockholdings – ’return correlation’
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Note: Stockholdings in the baseline model and in the variation
with positive correlation between assets returns and the housing
price normalized by the expected labor income in the first period.
Chapter 7
Shortcomings and
Concluding Remarks
Bond Holdings. While the model manages to reproduce the gen-
eral life cycle pattern of observed stock market participation rates it
does not predict realistic portfolio shares conditional on asset market
participation. In the model, interest payments on the mortgage ex-
ceed the risk free return. Hence, no investor is willing to hold debt and
bonds at the same time as she can renegotiate her mortgage level at no
cost. Cocco (2005) discusses two possible extensions: first, adjustment
costs for the mortgage level might be introduced into the model. The
investor would then be induced to accommodate small variations in
wealth by adjusting her liquid bond holdings. However, that strategy
requires the introduction of outstanding debt as an additional state
variable with significant negative impact on computation speed. An
alternative approach supposes that investors need to hold minimum
levels of liquid bonds for transaction purposes. The minimum lev-
els might for instance be related to lagged nondurable consumption.
While the second strategy is computationally more feasible, it requires
ad-hoc parameterization of the liquidity need.
Voluntary and Forced Moving. In the model presented here ad-
justments of housing stock are voluntary and endogenous. However,
there are good reasons for assuming exogenous shocks that have an
impact on the households’ desired housing stock. First, the demand
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for housing stock most certainly depends on the household size which
varies over the life cycle. Critical events might include the marriage,
children who suddenly appear and then disappear again after two
decades, possibly a divorce or the death of a family member. Second,
health related shocks can not only affect people’s earning abilities, but
also their demand for housing: permanent illness might, for instance,
force elderly investors to permanently live in an old people’s home,
also reducing the demand for housing stock. Moreover, investors who
downsize from larger to smaller homes due to an exogenous shock now
need to allocate the proceeds among stocks and bonds. Those aspects
are absent from my model, though.
I have argued in this thesis that the coexistence of financial and real
assets can have significant impact on optimal household portfolios.
Liquidity constraints interact with an exogenous minimum investment
requirement and show potential to explain observed asset market par-
ticipation patterns. For the young household, the desire to own a
house depresses financial savings. This effect is even stronger in the
presence of transaction costs in housing market: young households
now anticipate future increases in wealth, and thus housing demand,
which leads to even higher housing investments in the first periods.
Less households reach the minimum investment requirement early in
life – participation rates among the young are lower.
Appendix A
Results of Portfolio Choice
Theory
A.1 Appendix to Section 2.1
The housing stock is fixed its current level. The portfolio share of
housing, the ratio of the housing stock to total wealth, is thus fixed to
αh = α¯h. The investor’s problem is
min
α
α′Ωα subject to (A.1)
α′µ+Rf = R¯
αh = α¯h.
One can define the Lagrangian and calculate the first order conditions.
Note that the subscript −h identifies the same vector as before except
for the missing last element that concerns housing. In order to high-
light the connection with the coefficient of relative risk aversion the
Lagrange multiplier is set to 2θ.
L = α′−hΣα−h + α2hσ2h + 2αhα′−hΓsh −
2
θ
(
α′−hµ−i + αhµh +R
f − R¯)
(A.2)
∂L
∂α′−h
= Σα−h + αhΓsh − 1
θ
µ−h = 0 (A.3)
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Solving for the optimal portfolio shares leads to the well known solution
∀i,
αi = Σ−1
µi
θ
− αhΣ−1Γsh . (A.4)
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A.2 Appendix to Section 2.2
In this section which draws on the appendix to (Campbell and Viceira
2002) I will show that αopt indeed maximizes E
[
(1 +Rp)1−θ
]
in our
value function under the assumption of CRRA utility and jointly log-
normally distributed returns for equity and housing investments. As
preliminary step I will first derive an expression for log(1 +Rp) = rp.
In this section I depart from the previous notation in that I use the
symbol Σ for the variance-covariance matrix of all returns as housing
is just an additional asset without any special feature in this model.(
Rs
Rh
)
∼ LN
([
µs
µh
]
,Σ
)
(A.5)
Finding an Expression for rp. As already mentioned, the total
portfolio return depends on the portfolio shares α and the returns of
equity and housing investments which are stacked into the vector R.
Rp = Rf +α′(R−Rf ι) (A.6)
One can modify this equation in order to find an expression for
rp− rf as a function of r− rf ι and the portfolio shares. I will call this
function G.
1 +Rp
1 +Rf
= 1 +α′
[
1+Rs
1+Rf
−1
1+Rh
1+Rf
−1
]
(A.7)
rp − rf = log
(
1 +α′
(
exp(r − rf ι)− 1
))
= G(r − rf ι) (A.8)
A second-order Taylor expansion around the point rs = rh = rf
leads to
G(r − rf ι) ≈ G(0) +G′|0(r − rf ι)
+
1
2
(r − rf ι)′G′′|0(r − rf ι) (A.9)
where
G(0) = 0 (A.10)
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G′| 0 = δG
δα
=
(
αs
αh
)
(A.11)
G′′| 0 = δ
2G
δα δα′
=
(
αs(1− αs) −αsαh
−αsαh αh(1− αh)
)
. (A.12)
Thus,
G(r − rf ι) ≈ αs(rs − rf ) + αh(rh − rf )
+
1
2
αs(1− αs)σ2s +
1
2
αh(1− αh)σ2h − αsαhσsh , (A.13)
which in matrix notation takes on the nicer form
G(r − rf ι) ≈ α′(r − rf ι) + 1
2
α′σ2 − 1
2
α′Σα . (A.14)
The elegant expression that has been derived for rp will simplify
the optimization problem below.
rp ≈ rf +α′(r − rf ι) + 1
2
α′σ2 − 1
2
α′Σα (A.15)
Optimization. Maximizing the last part of the value function above,
E
[
(1 +Rp)1−θ
]
. Obviously, the problem is equivalent to maximiz-
ing log E
[
(1 +Rp)1−θ
]
. Note that I assumed jointly lognormally dis-
tributed returns on the risky equity and housing investments. This
allows the use of a very general property. Let X ∼ LN such that
logX follows a normal distribution with logX = x ∼ N(µ, σ2). Then,
EX = exp
(
µ+
1
2
σ2
)
logEX = E logX +
1
2
var (logX) . (A.16)
Hence, one can find the optimal portfolio shares as
αopt = argmax
[
E
[
log
(
(1 +Rp)1−θ
)]
+
1
2
var
[
log
(
(1 +Rp)1−θ
)]]
= argmax
[
E(rp) +
1− θ
2
var(rp)
]
(A.17)
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Plugging in the expression for rp one ends up with
αopt = argmax
[
rf +α′
[
E(r − rf ι) + σ
2
2
]
− 1
2
α′Σα+
1− θ
2
α′Σα
]
= argmax
[
rf +α′
[
E(r − rf ι) + σ
2
2
]
− θ
2
α′Σα
]
. (A.18)
It is now easy to derive the first order condition and solve for the
optimal portfolio shares,
0 = E(r − rf ι) + σ
2
2
− θΣα (A.19)
αopt =
1
θ
Σ−1
[
E(r − rf ι) + σ
2
2
]
. (A.20)
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A.3 Appendix to Section 2.4
For simplicity I will present a derivation for the case with only one
risky asset in addition to housing and the risk-free investment op-
portunity. (Pelizzon and Weber 2003) set their model in continuous
time and assume that stock and house prices follow Brownian motion
with zero drift and constant variance σX and σP respectively. The
covariance between house prices and asset prices is denoted by σXP .
I follow (Flavin and Nakagawa 2004) and use the amount of funds
invested into stocks as the choice variable instead of the number of
shares bought. To be exact, note that σX really refers to the variance
of the asset price and not the variance of the investment in stocks X.
However, the equations can be read more easily using this notation.
The investments’ values thus evolve according to
∆PtHt = PtHt
(
(µH + rf )∆t+∆ωHtHt
)
(A.21)
∆Xt = Xt
(
(µX + rf )∆t+∆ωXtXt
)
(A.22)
where rf stands for the risk-free return, µ for each asset’s expected
excess return. Assume that the household does not adjust the level of
the housing stock during a time interval (0, s). During that interval
wealth evolves according to
∆Wt =
(
rfWt + PtH0µH +XtµX − Ct
)
∆t
+Xt∆ωXt + PtH0∆ωHt . (A.23)
By the Bellman principle of optimality the value function can be
expresses as
V0(H0,W0) =
sup
{Ct}{Xt}
E
{∫ s
0
e−δtu(H0, Ct)∆t+ e−δtVs(H0,Ws)
}
(A.24)
subject to the budget constraint and the return processes. The integral
intuitively represents the sum of utility rewards in the period (0, s) plus
the expected discounted value of future rewards given that behavior
after period s is optimal. By subtracting V(H0,W0), dividing by s and
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letting s go to zero the following expression can be found.
0 = lim
s→0
sup
{Ct}{Xt}
E
{
1
s
∫ s
0
e−δtu(H0, Ct)∆t
+
1
s
(
e−δtVs(H0,Ws)− V0(H0,W0)
)}
(A.25)
By Ito’s lemma, this can be rewritten as
0 = sup
{Ct}
{
u(H0, Ct)− δV0(H0,W0) + ∂V
∂W
(
rfW0 + P0H0µH +X0µX − C0
)
∂V
∂P
P0µH +
1
2
∂2V
∂W 2
(
X20σ
2
X + P
2
0H
2
0σ
2
P + 2P0H0X0σXP
)}
(A.26)
0⇔ sup
{Ct}
{
u(H0, Ct)− C0 ∂V
∂W
}
− δV0(H0,W0) + ∂V
∂W
(
rfW0 + P0H0µH
)
+
1
2
∂2V
∂W 2
P 20H
2
0σ
2
P + sup
{Xt}
{
∂V
∂W
X0µX +
1
2
∂2V
∂W 2
(
X20σ
2
X + 2P0H0X0σXP
)}
.
(A.27)
The tedious derivation now leads to two first order conditions –
the standard condition for non-durable consumption ∂u∂C =
∂V
∂W and
the first order condition for the investment in stocks
∂V
∂W
µX +
∂2V
∂W 2
(
X0σ
2
X + P0H0σXP
)
= 0 (A.28)
which can be rearranged to yield the optimal level of investments in
the risky asset and the optimal portfolio share accorded to the risky
asset
Xopt0 =
{− ∂V∂W
∂2V
∂W 2
}
µX
σ2X
− P0H0σXP
σ2X
(A.29)
αoptX =
{ − ∂V∂W
∂2V
∂W 2
W
}
µX
σ2X
− αH σXP
σ2X
. (A.30)
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Equation (2.16) is the exact equivalent for the case with multiple risky
assets and the following variance-covariance structure between returns
Ω =
(
Σ Γs h
Γ′s h σ
2
h
)
. (A.31)
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